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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1, Amicus Curiae 
Internet Association certifies that it is not a subsidiary or affiliate of any other entity, 
and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.  
Dated:  May 3, 2019 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 
By:  /s/ Ian C. Ballon  
Ian C. Ballon 
Lori Chang 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,  
Internet Association 
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INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE 
A. Identity and Interests of Amicus Curiae 
Internet Association (“IA”) is a national not-for-profit trade organization 
representing America’s leading Internet companies and their global community of 
users. IA is dedicated to fostering innovation, promoting economic growth, and 
empowering people through the free and open internet, and its members1 operate 
many of the world’s largest and most popular online services. 
B. This Amicus Curiae Brief is Relevant to and Will Assist This Court’s  
En Banc Determination 
IA offers this brief to demonstrate that the panel opinion: (i) creates a circuit 
split with this Court’s prior rulings, which broadly construe the term publication 
within the meaning of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, 
(“CDA”); and (ii) contravenes statutory language, legislative history, and inter-
circuit decisions construing the CDA, thus thwarting the development of  
e-commerce, which Congress enacted the statute to promote. 
I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should grant appellants’ petition for rehearing en banc of the 
HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2019) decision 
because the panel opinion: (i) creates an intra-circuit split with this Court’s prior 
                                           
1 A complete list of IA member companies is available at: 
https://internetassociation.org/our-members/. 
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rulings, which broadly construe the term publication within the meaning of the 
CDA; and (ii) contravenes statutory language, legislative history, and decisions from 
other circuits construing the CDA, thus thwarting the development of e-commerce, 
which Congress enacted the statute to promote.  
Before the panel opinion, this Circuit uniformly held that the CDA broadly 
“protects websites from liability for material posted on the website by someone 
else.” Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016); see 
also Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 2016). But in affirming a 
decision upholding an ordinance making online platforms liable for “booking 
transactions” that result from user listings of ostensibly unlicensed properties, the 
panel opinion “treats” platforms as “the publisher or speaker” of information 
“provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). This is 
precisely the result Congress enacted the CDA to avoid. See id. § 230(e)(3) (“No 
cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or 
local law that is inconsistent with this section.”). 
The panel’s decision contravenes this Court’s precedent interpreting the CDA. 
The holding is inconsistent with Internet Brands, which ruled the CDA shields 
interactive computer service providers from a state law imposing a duty to warn 
premised on online content. 824 F.3d at 849. The Internet Brands court clarified in 
an amended opinion that a claim premised on a platform’s alleged failure to warn 
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plaintiff of a danger associated with its website did not implicate the CDA because 
(and only because) the information forming the basis for the claim was allegedly 
acquired by defendant “from an outside source, not from monitoring postings on the 
[platform’s] website.”  See Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 767 F.3d 894 (9th 
Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, op. withdrawn, 778 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2015), replaced 
by, 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016). By contrast, where, as here, liability is premised 
on user content posted online, the CDA provides immunity from any obligation to 
publish, not publish, or remove the material. See, e.g., Internet Brands, 834 F.3d at 
850; see also Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1269-70 (affirming dismissal of defamation claim 
brought against Yelp over negative customer reviews submitted by third-party 
users); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 1062 (2007) (holding that the CDA preempted a state right of 
publicity claim brought against a membership-based subscription platform); 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com. Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 
online dating site immune under the CDA from liability for various claims arising 
out of third party’s submission of phony profile purporting to belong to plaintiff). 
Further, in holding that “processing” online transactions takes a platform 
outside the scope of the CDA, the panel decision departs from preexisting case law. 
The commercial nature of an interactive computer service has never before been 
grounds for denying CDA immunity. See, e.g., Fair Housing Council v. 
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Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (partially 
immunizing website “which seeks to profit by collecting revenue from advertisers 
and subscribers”); Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1108 (immunizing platform that “allows 
consumers to use credit cards or checks to pay for subscriptions or memberships to 
e-commerce venues”); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124-25 (immunizing a commercial 
online dating service). Where, as here, an ordinance seeks to hold a platform liable 
for “exercis[ing] a publisher’s ‘traditional editorial functions—such as deciding 
whether to publish, withdraw, post-pone, or alter content” (which necessarily means 
monitor and review content)—the platform is entitled to CDA immunity. 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1184 (citation omitted); see also Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 
1266 (prohibiting parties from “plead[ing] around the CDA to advance the same 
basic argument that the statute plainly bars”).  
To say the ordinance “does not require the Platforms to review the content 
provided by the hosts of the listings on their websites” (HomeAway.com, 918 F.3d 
at 682) is simply untrue. The City admits the ordinance requires platforms to 
“determine whether [a] unit is properly licensed for rental” before processing a 
transaction (ECF No. 30 at 20), which can be done only by actually reviewing each 
listing requested for booking. Further, platforms have no practical means of 
compliance other than removing potentially unlawful listings. Both review and 
removal are quintessential publishing activities. As this Court explained, the CDA 
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“shields from liability all publication decisions, whether to edit, to remove, or to 
post, with respect to content generated entirely by third parties,” and insulates both 
“affirmative acts of publication [and] . . . the refusal to remove . . . material.” Barnes 
v. Yahoo! Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 & n.11 (9th Cir. 2009).  
Although the ordinance purports to impose liability on platforms only for 
processing “booking transactions” of unregistered properties, its operation and effect 
“hold [appellants] liable as the ‘publisher or speaker’” of rental listings by penalizing 
platforms for enabling third-party booking transactions that violate the ordinance, 
and is thus barred by the CDA. Cf. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 850-51 (holding that 
the CDA did not bar a claim for failure to warn under California law because the 
claim “d[id] not seek to hold Internet Brands liable as the ‘publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider’”).  
En banc review of the panel’s decision is further warranted because both the 
ordinance and the panel’s underlying rationale, if left to stand, would frustrate the 
CDA’s legislative aims and chill the development of e-commerce—the very thing 
Congress enacted the CDA to promote. Curtailing the CDA’s broad protections by 
distinguishing between hosting and processing user content (under a statute that 
immunizes platforms from any liability for user content), would stifle innovation by 
threatening a basic and ubiquitous e-commerce business model that exists for the 
purpose of facilitating user transactions. Creating a de facto judicial exception to the 
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CDA by allowing municipalities to punish internet companies for failing to enforce 
local regulations by monitoring and removing or not publishing potentially 
objectionable user content, also imposes an undue burden on platforms given the 
volume of content online (illustrated by the fact that appellants themselves hosted a 
combined 1,700 live listings in Santa Monica in a single month, see HomeAway.com, 
918 F.3d at 679). Absent a reversal, the panel opinion creates barriers to entry for e-
commerce businesses, forces out smaller companies that lack the resources to 
comply with local regulatory schemes, and harms the millions of users who depend 
on services provided by platforms. 
Amicus curiae respectfully requests this Court to rehear the panel decision en 
banc.2  
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Panel Decision Creates an Intra-Circuit Split with This Court’s Prior 
Decisions Broadly Construing the CDA 
This Circuit has held the CDA “precludes liability that treats a website as the 
publisher or speaker of information users provide on the website.” Internet Brands, 
                                           
2 Both parties have consented to the filing of this brief; no party’s counsel authored 
this brief in whole or in part; no party or party’s counsel contributed money that 
was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief; and no person other than 
IA contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. 
See Fed. R. App. P 29(a)(4)(e). 
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824 F.3d at 850 (emphasis added).3 As such, “any activity that can be boiled down 
to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is 
perforce immune under section 230.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1170-71. Where 
a platform publishes third-party content, this Court has recognized the CDA 
establishes “broad federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service 
providers liable for information originating with a third-party user . . . .” Perfect 10, 
488 F.3d at 1118 (citation omitted). 
Here, the panel held the ordinance does not implicate the CDA because it does 
not expressly require platforms “to review the content provided by the hosts of 
listings on their websites,” but rather to “monitor[] . . . incoming requests to complete 
a transaction—content that, while resulting from the third-party listings, is distinct, 
internal and nonpublic.” HomeAway.com, 918 F.3d at 682. But these so-called 
“incoming requests” are actually computerized transactions that are processed online 
                                           
3 The CDA shields interactive computer service providers, including platform 
providers, from liability for publishing third-party content by mandating that: 
 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider. 
 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Section 230 further states that: 
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed 
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section. 
Id. § 230(e)(3) (emphasis added). 
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by the platforms “hundreds of times daily” (Dkt. 12 at 11) as a result of a process 
driven completely by third-party users, where a user views a property listing and 
responds to the host by inputting data on appellants’ websites. In addition, this Court 
makes no distinction between the outward- and inward-facing nature of third-party 
content. See, e.g., Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853 (ruling that the CDA immunizes 
platforms from liability for “failure to adequately . . . monitor internal 
communications”); Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 700 F. App’x 588, 590 (9th Cir. 
2017) (affirming dismissal, under the CDA, of various tort claims arising out of 
Facebook’s refusal to remove private images and videos “because the basis for each 
of these claims is Facebook’s role as a ‘republisher’ of material posted by a third 
party”); Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1127-29 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 
(holding that Twitter acted as a publisher of private direct messages sent by users 
and broadly construing the term publisher under the CDA), aff’d on other grounds, 
881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018). Indeed, the statute itself creates no such distinction 
between internal/external and public/non-public content.4  
                                           
4 As one commentator noted, “there would have been no need to statutorily exclude 
ECPA claims from Section 230’s reach,” see 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(4), if the CDA is 
construed to “not apply to private messaging functions,” as the panel’s distinction 
suggests. See Eric Goldman, Ninth Circuit Chunks Another Section 230 Ruling—
HomeAway v. Santa Monica (Catch-up Post), TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW 
BLOG (May 1, 2019), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/05/ninth-circuit-
chunks-another-section-230-ruling-homeaway-v-santa-monica-catch-up-post.htm. 
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Because a substantial number of modern platforms do not publish sensitive 
information in view of privacy concerns, excluding “internal” or “nonpublic” 
content from CDA immunity would have the unintended effect of encouraging 
platforms to publish information at the expense of protecting consumer privacy to 
avoid losing CDA protection.   
The panel erred by narrowly construing the CDA and holding that the 
ordinance falls outside of the CDA’s immunity because it does not on its face 
“require the Platforms to monitor third-party content” or “expressly mandate” that 
platforms remove unlawful listings. HomeAway.com, 918 F.3d at 682-83. This is not 
the relevant inquiry. Rather, Ninth Circuit jurisprudence instructs that “courts [] ask 
whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the 
defendant’s status or conduct as a publisher or speaker. If it does, section 230(c)(1) 
precludes liability.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102 (emphasis added).  
This Court’s decision in Internet Brands is instructive. 824 F.3d at 850-51. In 
that case, the Court held the CDA did not bar plaintiff from alleging a failure to warn 
claim against a platform that obtained information “from an outside source about 
how third parties targeted and lured victims” through that platform, because 
plaintiff’s claim did not seek to impose liability for the platform’s role as a 
“publisher or speaker” of third-party content. Id. at 851. It explained “[t]he duty to 
warn allegedly imposed by California law would not require [the platform] to 
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remove any user content or otherwise affect how it publishes or monitors such 
content,” because “[a]ny obligation to warn could have been satisfied without 
changes to the content posted by the website’s users.” Id. (emphasis added). Internet 
Brands makes clear however that the “essential question” is not whether the 
ordinance expressly regulates content, but whether it “inherently requires” treating 
platforms “as a publisher or speaker” of the rental listings. Id. at 850. Indeed, the 
CDA expressly prohibits local laws that are “inconsistent” with its broad protections. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).  
This Court’s own CDA framework compels reversing the district court 
opinion because compliance with the ordinance by platforms is premised on a duty 
to monitor user content and the exercise of “‘traditional editorial functions—such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, post-pone, or alter content.’” 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1184 (emphasis added); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 
1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-
33 (4th Cir. 1997)). The ordinance imposes on platforms a duty to verify that online 
bookings occur only for licensed properties. Unlike the duty to warn, which Internet 
Brands held could be satisfied by posting a warning instead of removing third party 
content, platforms cannot comply with the duty to verify without first determining 
whether the rental listings are compliant. This in turn requires platforms to monitor, 
review, and “cross-reference” against the City’s property registry, HomeAway.com, 
  Case: 18-55367, 05/03/2019, ID: 11286744, DktEntry: 91-1, Page 16 of 26
 - 12 - 
918 F.3d at 682, and “decid[e] whether to publish or [] withdraw” or deactivate user 
listings that are unlicensed—all of which constitute traditional editorial functions. 
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102 (reiterating “that publication involves reviewing . . . third-
party content”); see also Batzel 333 F.3d at 1031 (ruling that “the exclusion of 
‘publisher’ liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual 
prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material”); Roommates, 521 
F.3d at 1170-71 (holding the CDA immunizes activity “that can be boiled down to 
deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online”); Fields, 
217 F. Supp. 3d at 1123 (“Courts have repeatedly described publishing activity under 
section 230(c)(1) as including decisions about what third-party content may be 
posted online;” holding that “providing accounts to ISIS is publishing activity, just 
like monitoring, reviewing, and editing content”), aff’d on other grounds, 881 F.3d 
739 (9th Cir. 2018). Hence, under this Circuit’s own standard, the activity regulated 
by the ordinance falls squarely within CDA immunity. 
The distinction drawn by the panel between platforms like Airbnb and 
HomeAway.com and websites like Craigslist that do not provide booking services, 
is—and must be—irrelevant under the CDA. The statute draws no distinction 
between platforms that merely host user content and those that facilitate user 
transactions (which include a myriad of online marketplaces)—and imposing such 
an arbitrary dichotomy is antithetical to Congress’s intent to develop e-commerce 
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through enacting the CDA. See, e.g., Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174-75 
(immunizing Roommate.com under the CDA for some activities, even though it 
collected revenue from advertisers and subscribers); Godard v. Google, Inc., No. C 
08-2738 (PVT), 2008 WL 5245490, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (applying Ninth Circuit 
law in holding “the fact that a website elicits online content for profit is immaterial; 
the only relevant inquiry is whether the interactive service provider ‘creates’ or 
‘develops’ that content”). Courts have routinely found the CDA does not depend on 
whether a site is operated for profit or involves the processing of transactions; for 
example, the CDA has been held to shield both non-transactional and transactional 
platforms alike from liability arising out of user listings.5 Numerous courts have also 
recognized that conduct on the internet is often inextricably intertwined with content, 
and thus efforts to impose liability on online businesses for alleged user misconduct 
                                           
5 See, e.g., Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1269 (Yelp); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100-01 
(Yahoo!); Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 27-28 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(GoDaddy.com); Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(Google); Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 
419 (1st Cir. 2007) (RagingBull.com); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31 (AOL); Gentry v. 
eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 717-18 (Ct. App. 2002) (eBay); Schneider v. 
Amazon.com, 31 P.3d 37, 42-43 (Wash. App. 2001) (Amazon); Hill v. StubHub, 
Inc., 727 SE 2d 550 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (StubHub); La Park La Brea A LLC v. 
Airbnb, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1103-04 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (Airbnb).  
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(or to require those businesses to police and prevent misconduct) often amount to 
treating a platform as the publisher or speaker of user content.6 
En banc review is therefore appropriate because the panel decision adopted 
an impermissibly narrow reading of the CDA that conflicts with this Circuit’s own 
decisions interpreting the statute. See, e.g., Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.7  
                                           
6 See, e.g., Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18-24 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(affirming dismissal of civil claims brought under human trafficking statutes as 
preempted by CDA); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1031 (2008) (immunizing MySpace under the CDA for 
failing to implement measures to prevent minor from being contacted by predator); 
Green v. America Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 877 (2003) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that allegedly defamatory material 
posted about him in a chat room and a computer virus sent to him from a third 
party were not preempted by section 230(c)(1) because they involved AOL’s own 
misconduct); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal 
of a claim by college athletes who were secretly video-recorded against platforms 
who hosted and sold the videos). 
7 The few instances when the CDA was found inapplicable by this Court involved 
unique fact patterns—not judicial exceptions to the broad sweep of the CDA or 
restrictions on what constitutes publication. See, e.g., Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 
(remanding to district court on whether CDA immunity applied where a 
communication that was republished online may not have been intended for 
publication); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105, 1109 (affirming dismissal of negligence 
claims but not a promissory estoppel claim based on the service provider’s alleged 
affirmative undertaking to provide assistance in removing material that it would not 
otherwise have been required to remove under the “baseline rule” of CDA); Internet 
Brands, 824 F.3d at 851 (ruling that the CDA did not bar negligence claim where 
defendant failed to warn plaintiff about the risks of being raped by a user of Model 
Mayhem, where the information was allegedly acquired by the defendant offline, 
and not based on monitoring user content posted on the website). 
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B. The Panel Decision Contravenes Statutory Language, Legislative 
History, and Decisions From Other Circuits, Thus Thwarting the 
Development of E-Commerce 
In enacting the CDA, Congress made a “legislative choice” to shield platforms 
and intermediaries from content-based liability because it “wanted to encourage the 
unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and to 
promote the development of e-commerce.” Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027; see also 47 
U.S.C. § 230(b). Congress was concerned that “[m]aking interactive computer 
services and their users liable for the speech of third parties would severely restrict 
the information available on the Internet. Section 230 therefore sought to prevent 
lawsuits from shutting down websites and other services on the Internet.” Batzel, 
333 F.3d at 1027-28. By shielding websites from liability originating from third-
parties, Congress also sought to encourage, and not penalize, self-regulation and 
“voluntary monitoring” by intermediaries. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1110-11; see also 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31 (holding that the CDA reflects Congress’s intent “not to 
deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on 
companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious 
messages”). Further, because the CDA, by its plain terms, protects both providers 
and users of interactive computer services, a judicially created exception to allow 
Santa Monica to penalize Airbnb and HomeAway for not reviewing and deleting 
allegedly noncompliant listings would also justify similar punitive measures against 
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individual users for republishing third party content, thereby chilling free speech. 
See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407-
08 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting the CDA was also enacted to protect “against the 
‘heckler’s veto’ that would chill free speech . . .”) (citation omitted). 
In asserting the ordinance would not hinder Congressional policy underlying 
the CDA, the panel ignores these animating principles. See HomeAway.com, 918 
F.3d at 683. Weakening the CDA’s broad protections for platforms that profit from 
facilitating user transactions would jeopardize a business model that has led to 
“economic empowerment and social change.”8 Under the panel’s narrow reading of 
the CDA, platforms—including new start-ups—would be deterred from offering 
more innovative transaction processing services for fear of being subject to myriad 
                                           
8 Devin Wenig, The Sharing Economy Pays it Forward (Mar. 24, 2016) 
(explaining that marketplaces “are driving utilization and using technology to 
unlock hidden value—the hidden value in unused inventory, empty rooms and 
shared transportation”), https://www.ebayinc.com/stories/news/the-sharing-
economy-pays-it-forward/; see also Kevin Wright, Along for the ride: Tracking the 
sharing economy’s impact on GDP, Ten Magazine, The Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City (November 15, 2017) (“Industry analysts say the popularity of sharing 
services has grown because they are simple to use and provide customers options 
that traditional industries have made more difficult to obtain or use”), 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publications/ten/articles/2017/fall/ridesharing; 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Economic and 
Social Role of Internet Intermediaries, 40 (2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/4/44949023.pdf (“[O]nline platforms are more 
efficient at matching supply and demand than their offline counterparts.”). 
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local regulations from across the country.9 This would undermine the CDA’s 
protections that are expressly aimed at future growth . See, e.g., Jones, 755 F.3d at 
408 (“The protection provided by § 230 has been understood to merit expansion.”).  
The panel also failed to give adequate consideration to the problem that 
platforms subject to the ordinance are afforded no meaningful “choice” but to engage 
in editorial functions to either remove or de-activate noncompliant rental listings. 
See HomeAway.com, 918 F.3d at 683. Indeed, the panel “acknowledge[d] that. . . 
removal of [ostensibly noncompliant] listings would be the best option “from a 
business standpoint.” Id. Platforms can hardly innovate or further develop if they 
host listings that cannot be booked, as doing so would defeat the utility of platforms 
and erode business from consumers who would otherwise assume those listings are 
available. This outcome hardly promotes the CDA’s express findings and policy to 
“preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the 
internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b); see also Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 
F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Recourse to competition is consistent with the 
                                           
9 See Goldman, supra n.2 (noting that the panel’s “approval of verification 
obligations will open the door for other pernicious regulatory efforts,” such as 
incentivizing cities to “deputize online services as their law enforcement operators 
for business licenses” to “generate net incremental revenues to the city” despite the 
“horrible transaction costs socially”). 
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/05/ninth-circuit-chunks-another-
section-230-ruling-homeaway-v-santa-monica-catch-up-post.htm. 
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statute’s express policy of relying on the market for the development of interactive 
computer services.”).  
As this Court has acknowledged, platform providers are not in a position to 
police activity for a multiplicity of municipal violations across the country. Perfect 
10, 488 F.3d at 1118 (“Because material on a website may be viewed across the 
Internet, and thus in more than one state at a time, permitting the reach of any 
particular state’s [local laws] to dictate the contours of this federal immunity would 
be contrary to Congress’s expressed goal of insulating the development of the 
Internet from the various state-law regimes.”). But for the statutory immunity 
provided by section 230, myriad internet platforms would be required to either 
contend with enforcement actions in multiple jurisdictions based on independent and 
varied regulatory regimes or err on the side of removing content and censoring 
speech—a “grim choice” Congress sought to “spare interactive computer services.” 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163. The costs and complexities associated with 
deputizing platforms to enforce local laws requiring content removal would be 
detrimental to internet commerce. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, amicus curiae respectfully requests this Court grant 
appellants’ petition for rehearing en banc. 
Dated:  May 3, 2019 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 
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